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Summary 
A defining feature of the banking systems in many transition countries is the large-scale presence 
of subsidiaries of multinational banks. We use new panel data on the intra-group ownership 
structure and the balance sheets of 45 of the largest banking groups in the world to analyse what 
determines the credit growth of their subsidiaries, many of which are in central and eastern Europe. 
We find that parent banks trade-off lending across several countries (“substitution effect”) and that 
they support weak subsidiaries (“support effect”). This provides evidence for the existence of 
internal capital markets through which multinational banks manage the credit growth of their 
subsidiaries. Greenfield subsidiaries are most closely integrated into such internal capital markets. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Across the world – but most notably in central and eastern Europe and Latin America – 
substantial parts of the banking system consist of subsidiaries of multinational banks. Also 
in large transition countries, such as Russia and China, the process of multinational bank 
penetration is expected to accelerate in the near future. Although many multinational banks 
are headquartered in Western Europe, banking consolidation in Western Europe itself has 
primarily occurred within national borders. However, the recent take-overs of German 
HVB Group by the Italian Unicredit Group and of ABN Amro by a consortium of Fortis 
Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander, have been heralded in the media as 
the start of cross-border consolidation in this part of the world as well. 
 
The importance of cross-border banking consolidation and the related emergence of 
multinational banking groups have initiated a debate among policy-makers about the 
economic impact on the countries involved. Host countries in particular have a keen 
interest in the amount of money that multinational bank subsidiaries are willing to lend to 
domestic firms and households. When multinational banks enter a country – either through 
greenfield establishments or through taking over existing banks – the parent holding 
company may play an important role in determining the pace of local credit expansion. 
 
The empirical banking literature has remained relatively silent on the question of whether 
(legally independent) subsidiaries of multinational banks behave like economically 
independent organisations, similar to unaffiliated domestic banks. We use a new detailed 
dataset on the ownership structure and the credit supply of multinational banking groups to 
examine whether parent banks actively manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. A 
substantial part of our dataset concerns multinational bank subsidiaries in transition 
countries, including Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine. We make a 
distinction between greenfield subsidiaries and take-over subsidiaries, as well as between 
subsidiaries that are geographically close to their parent bank and those that are further 
away. We analyse how lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is influenced by the 
macroeconomic situation in the host country and the home country, the subsidiary’s own 
financial characteristics, the financial characteristics of the parent bank and the financial 
characteristics of other subsidiaries in the same banking group.1 This is the first paper to 
analyse these determinants of multinational bank lending within an integrated empirical 
framework. 
 
Our detailed information on intra-bank ownership structures also allows us to deal with a 
problem that has plagued earlier empirical literature on multinational banking. Many 
studies that use aggregate bank lending data have difficulty in distinguishing between 
 
1 We use the terms “parent bank” and “bank holding” alternately. “Host country” refers to the country where 
a multinational bank subsidiary operates and “home country” refers to the country where the parent bank is 
domiciled. “Other countries” are defined from the perspective of a particular subsidiary and include all other 
countries where the parent bank owns subsidiaries, excluding the host country of the particular subsidiary and 
excluding the home country. For example, in the case of HSBC Poland, the host country is Poland, the home 
country is the United Kingdom, and “other countries” refers to all countries where HSBC owns subsidiaries 
except for Poland and the United Kingdom. 
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 general macroeconomic linkages between countries and the specific financial linkages in 
the form of multinational banks. The robustness tests at the end of this paper allow us to 
disentangle both factors. 
 
Our results show that parent banks indeed trade off lending across several countries 
(substitution effect) as they expand their business in those countries where economic 
conditions improve and decrease their activities where economic circumstances worsen. 
We also find that multinational banks tend to support weak subsidiaries (support effect). 
Both findings provide evidence for the existence of internal capital markets through which 
multinational banks manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. Greenfield subsidiaries, 
and also subsidiaries that are at a greater geographical distance from their parent banks, 
turn out to be most closely integrated into such internal capital markets. In particular, we 
find that while the credit growth of (strongly integrated) greenfield subsidiaries is not 
sensitive to their own balance-sheet strength, this does not hold for the (more independent) 
take-overs. Apparently, the latter group can rely less on parental support and is thus forced 
to slow down their lending if their balance sheet gets weaker. 
 
Our findings also provide more general evidence that confirms anecdotal observations 
made during the recent global liquidity squeeze that started in the summer of 2007. An 
interesting case is the experience of the Kazakh banking system. For several years, Kazakh 
banks had depended on foreign funding to maintain their very high credit growth rates. 
Following the recent turmoil, most banks in Kazakhstan were forced to shelve refinancing 
plans through international bond issues or syndicated loans. This sudden stop in the 
availability of foreign financing translated directly into lower lending growth. However, 
not all banks in Kazakhstan were equally affected by the increased risk averseness of 
global financiers. For instance, ATF Bank, a mid-sized Kazakh bank, was acquired by the 
Italian UniCredit group in June 2007. Shortly after it obtained a one-year US$ 120 million 
credit line from its new parent bank as well as short-term credits totalling US$ 470 million. 
The stated goal of the parent bank was to support its new Kazakh subsidiary to continue its 
corporate and retail lending. This demonstrates the practical importance that parental 
support through internal capital markets may have within multinational banks. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the related 
literature and develop a number of theoretical priors. Section 2 then discusses the data we 
use, after which Section 3 explains our estimation methodology. Sections 4 and 5 present 
our empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
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 1. DETERMINANTS OF MULTINATIONAL BANK LENDING 
 
Internal capital markets and multinational bank lending 
This paper contributes to two areas in current banking research. A first strand of related 
literature deals with internal capital markets (Stein, 1997). In the absence of capital market 
frictions, a multinational bank would not operate an internal capital market. Subsidiaries 
would attract sufficient liabilities to finance profitable investment projects themselves and 
would choose their own credit growth strategy, independent of any financing from their 
parent bank. However, if capital markets do not function perfectly, subsidiaries may not be 
able to attract sufficient funds themselves.2 It is then advantageous for parent banks, with 
better access to external funding sources, to allocate scarce capital to their best-performing 
subsidiaries through an internal capital market. 
 
Empirical evidence on internal capital markets within banking groups is only available for 
the United States. Houston et al (1997) show for bank holding companies that the credit 
growth of a subsidiary is negatively correlated with the loan growth in other US 
subsidiaries of that holding. Dahl et al (2002), again for US bank holding companies only, 
show that such correlated credit growth patterns are due to net equity financing flows 
between the parent bank and its various subsidiaries. These papers therefore provide 
indirect and direct evidence, respectively, for bank holdings operating an internal capital 
market within a single country. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study 
this issue in an international context. The extension to an international context is important 
because empirical results based on national bank holdings may not apply to multinational 
banks because of the potentially large geographical and cultural distances (we return to this 
in Section 4.3).3 
 
The second strand of related literature analyses the effect of multinational bank presence 
on aggregate bank lending in host countries. This body of research is implicitly linked to 
the internal capital market literature, since the operation of internal markets forms the main 
channel through which multinational banks can influence the credit growth of foreign 
subsidiaries. Morgan et al (2004) provide a model of a two-country banking system that 
can be used to analyse how multinational banks allocate bank capital across borders in 
reaction to economic shocks in the home country or a host country.4 Such shocks can be 
either real economic shocks – leading to improved or reduced investment opportunities in a 
particular country – or bank-specific capital shocks that wipe out part of a subsidiary’s 
capital. The parent bank reacts to such shocks by reallocating its capital to ensure that the 
return on bank capital is equalised across all countries of operation. 
 
This optimising behaviour leads to two effects. First, in case part of a subsidiary’s capital 
is wiped out, the parent bank will – all else being equal – support this subsidiary by 
allocating additional capital and liquidity to it. We term this the support effect. Such 
 
2 Banks indeed face limitations with regard to the amount of capital they can raise (Froot and Stein, 1998). 
3 Regulatory constraints at the national level may influence multinational bank lending as well. However, we 
expect that such constraints are more important for the initial entry decision of a multinational bank (Cerutti 
et al, 2007; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005) than for the dynamics in credit expansion once a multinational bank 
has set up or acquired a subsidiary in a particular country. 
4 We use this model to derive our five theoretical priors as discussed in Section 2.2. 
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 parental support implies that the presence of multinational banks can dampen bank capital 
shocks in the host country. Secondly, the multinational bank (re-)allocates capital over its 
subsidiaries depending on the expected (risk-adjusted) returns that are available in a certain 
country. We term this the substitution effect. The substitution effect implies that the 
presence of multinational banks may sharpen business cycles as they use their internal 
capital markets to actively shift capital away from “low return countries” to “high return 
countries”. 
 
A limited number of empirical studies on multinational bank lending have been conducted 
and these tend to confirm that multinational banks transmit shocks across borders. In line 
with support effects, lending by multinational banks tends to dampen host country 
financial shocks5 and to transmit home country financial shocks.6 In line with substitution 
effects, multinational bank lending also tends to be positively correlated with the host 
country business cycle7 and to be correlated, either positively or negatively, with the home 
country business cycle.8 
 
Unfortunately, most of these empirical studies suffer from one or two important 
limitations. First, many studies limit themselves to multinational bank linkages between 
one specific home region (United States, Japan or Western Europe) and one specific host 
region (Latin America or central and eastern Europe). Secondly, a lot of studies are based 
on aggregate bank lending data, so that no bank-level information on intra-bank linkages 
can be exploited. This makes it difficult to convincingly attribute any empirical findings to 
multinational banks’ internal capital markets rather than to other more general, 
macroeconomic cross-country correlations.9 
 
We contribute to this second strand of literature by using a broader sample of host, home 
and other countries of operations, though with a focus on European banking groups. More 
importantly, we use a new bank-level panel dataset that allows us to analyse the 
international linkages between subsidiaries of a multinational banking group in more detail 
and to come to more robust conclusions as regards the importance of internal capital 
markets within such bank holdings. Lastly, whereas Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) analyse 
the determinants of multinational banks’ foreign expansion, we analyse what determines 
their lending behaviour once they have established foreign subsidiaries. 
 
 
 
 
5 Dages et al (2000), Peek and Rosengren (2000b), Goldberg (2001), Crystal et al (2002), Martinez Peria et 
al. (2002) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004, 2006). 
6 Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000a) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000, 2001). 
7 Dahl and Shrieves (1999), Buch (2000), Barajas and Steiner (2002), Jeanneau and Micu (2002), Morgan 
and Strahan (2004) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006). 
8 Hernandez and Rudolph (1995), Dahl and Shrieves (1999), Goldberg (2001), Jeanneau and Micu (2002), 
Martinez Peria et al (2002) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006). Depending on the sample period and the 
sample of countries, some studies find a positive correlation between multinational bank lending and the 
home country business cycle, while other studies find a negative relationship. 
9 Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000, 2001) find, for instance, that multinational banks transmit currency 
crises as they adjust credit lines to third countries in reaction to significant losses in a crisis country. 
However, the authors use aggregate Bank for International Settlements data by nationality of lender and are 
therefore unable to directly measure intra-bank linkages at the bank level. Our dataset overcomes this data 
limitation. 
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 Some priors on multinational bank lending 
We use the theoretical framework by Morgan et al (2004) to derive several priors on how 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is influenced by internal capital markets. The 
model by Morgan et al is a multinational extension of the one-country banking model by 
Holmström and Tirole (1997), which provides for a theoretical exposition of how financial 
intermediation influences the real economy. In this incentive model, multinational banks 
are capital constrained and risk neutral and transmit shocks because they rebalance their 
international credit portfolios in reaction to country-specific shocks. Based on this model, 
we formulate the following priors: 
1. Our first prior is that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is negatively related to 
the business cycle in the home country and to the business cycle in the other countries 
where the parent bank operates. More generally, we expect host country lending to be 
negatively related to macroeconomic developments that make lending in the home 
country and in other countries more attractive compared to credit expansion in the host 
country (substitution effect, see Section 1.1). 
2. Our second prior is that host country lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is 
insensitive to banking crises because they can rely on parental capital and liquidity 
back-up (support effect, see Section 1.1). This contrasts with the lending behaviour of 
domestic banks that tend to reduce lending during financial crises because their capital 
is reduced or because there is a reduced inflow (or even an outflow) of deposits. 
3. Third, we expect that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries will not only be 
sensitive to the financial characteristics of the subsidiary itself but also to the financial 
position of the parent bank or other subsidiaries. 
4. Fourth, we expect that the host country lending of multinational bank subsidiaries is 
positively related to the host country business cycle and to other host country 
macroeconomic developments that improve the risk/return characteristics of local 
lending. Although the credit supply of domestic banks may be procyclical as well, we 
expect that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is more procyclical because of 
the added influence of the parent bank operating an internal capital market (substitution 
effect). 
5. Fifth, we expect subsidiaries that are the result of a take-over to be relatively 
independent as they may not (yet) be fully integrated into the bank holding (see De 
Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). In contrast, we expect that newly established 
subsidiaries (greenfields) are relatively closely integrated into the bank holding and its 
capital allocation mechanism. 
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 2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Our sample of multinational banks is based on the Top 1000 list of the world’s largest 
banks (asset rank) as published by The Banker. Of the 150 largest banks we include all 
banks that operate more than one significant foreign subsidiary. For each of the 45 
remaining bank holdings, we identify – on the basis of information taken from BankScope, 
from banks’ web sites and based on correspondence with banks – all subsidiaries for which 
the assets account for 0.5 per cent or more of the parent bank’s assets in 2004 and that are 
at least 50 per cent owned by the parent bank.10 We therefore limit ourselves to relatively 
large subsidiaries in which the parent has a controlling stake.11 Note that multinational 
banks not only operate through foreign subsidiaries but also through foreign branches. For 
the purpose of this paper, in which we focus on the operation of internal capital markets 
within multinational banks, we are mainly interested in foreign subsidiaries as these are 
legally independent affiliates and as such require a separate capitalisation.12 
 
If parent banks are the result of a merger or acquisition in year t we only include them from 
year t+1 onwards. We only include banks for which we have at least three consecutive 
years of data, which means we have to exclude all Chinese and most Japanese banks. For 
each subsidiary, we trace back in which year t it became part of the holding. In case of 
greenfields we include data for the subsidiary from year t onwards, whereas subsidiaries 
that result from a take-over are included from t+1.13 A list of all bank holdings included in 
the sample can be found in Annex 1. As a double check on the quality of our database, we 
sent a letter to each parent bank asking it to confirm that the subsidiaries we had identified 
were indeed those considered as material by the parent bank itself. We also asked for the 
dates when non-greenfield subsidiaries were acquired. 
 
In a typical year, each parent bank in our sample is associated with, on average, 4.3 
subsidiaries. The geographical distribution of parent banks (subsidiaries) used in the final 
analysis is as follows: 83 per cent (73 per cent) in Europe (of which many parent banks in 
Western Europe and many subsidiaries in central and eastern Europe); 13 per cent (15 per 
cent) in North America; 0 per cent (2 per cent) in South America; 1 per cent (8 per cent) in 
Asia; and 3 per cent (2 per cent) in Australia. This distribution of our sample reflects that 
North American and Asia-Pacific banks are relatively domestically oriented, whereas 
European banks are far more internationalised on average (IMF, 2007, p. 101). In recent 
years, Western European banks such as Erste Bank, KBC, Raiffeisen Bank and UniCredit 
have rapidly expanded eastwards by setting up networks of subsidiaries in several 
transition countries. 
 
10 For each significant subsidiary (level 1) we also check whether it owns significant sub-subsidiaries (level 
2) that are larger than 0.5 per cent of the ultimate bank holding (level 0). If this is not the case, we include 
consolidated data for the level 1 subsidiaries. If this is the case, we include unconsolidated data for the level 1 
subsidiary and separately include consolidated data for the sub-subsidiary. 
11 We only include commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, real estate/mortgage banks and 
medium and long-term credit banks. We exclude investment banks, securities houses, government-owned 
banks and non-banking credit institutions. 
12 For more details on the factors that determine whether multinational banks set up foreign branches or 
subsidiaries, see Cerutti et al (2007). 
13 We do not include any subsidiaries based in Luxembourg or Switzerland, as in these countries 
multinational bank subsidiaries’ activities are mainly driven by the supply of deposits by (foreign) residents, 
rather than driven by either local macroeconomic developments or parent banks’ steering and capital support. 
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 Over time both the number and size of the banks included in our dataset have grown, as 
shown in Charts 1 and 2. Chart 1 illustrates that internationally active banks have become 
more international – measured in terms of the number of foreign subsidiaries – especially 
though take-overs. In terms of total assets, we see in Chart 2 that growth has been even 
faster. The relative proportions of the assets of take-overs, greenfields and the parent bank 
are stable over time with on average shares of 4 per cent, 20 per cent and 76 per cent of 
total assets in our sample, respectively. 
 
Chart 1: Number of banks (1992-2004)       Chart 2: Total assets (1992-2004) 
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We obtain financial data on all parent banks and subsidiaries from Bureau van Dijk’s 
BankScope database. Our sample period is 1991-2004, but the panel is unbalanced as we 
do not have data for all years for each bank. We correct for the fact that not all banks report 
in the same currency by redenominating all balance-sheet and income-statement variables 
into US dollars. 
 
Our dependent variable is the percentage growth of gross loans. To construct this gross 
credit growth variable, we add loan loss reserves to net loans. In doing so, we correct for 
changes in (net) loans that are not due to changes in banks’ output of new loans, but that 
are related to changes in banks’ loan loss provisioning. We checked for outliers and 
removed all observations with implausible values for one or more variables. To control for 
mergers and acquisitions, we also removed all observations where the absolute growth of 
gross loans exceeded 75 per cent. All in all, this data cleansing reduces our number of 
observations by 13 per cent.14 
 
Table 1 summarises our bank-level data for both parent banks and subsidiaries. 
Subsidiaries have on average a higher solvency, expressed as total equity to total assets, 
than parent banks. At the same time the subsidiaries in our sample expand their lending 
somewhat faster than parent banks, which may contribute to their on average lower 
profitability (return on equity). In a typical year, the average subsidiary accounts for about 
10 per cent of the assets of the average parent bank. 
 
 
 
 
14 We also ran estimations in which we only excluded those observations where absolute loan growth 
exceeded 100 per cent. This reduced our original dataset by only 6 per cent. However, our results stayed the 
same in terms of both the signs of the estimated coefficients as well as their statistical significance. 
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 Table 1:  Summary statistics for parent banks and subsidiaries 
 
 Solvency 
(%) 
Liquidity 
(%) 
Interest 
margin 
(%) 
Profitability 
(%) 
Weakness 
(%) 
Loan 
growth 
(%) 
Total assets 
(million $) 
Parent 
banks 
5.3 17.0 2.4 13.8 18.4 11.1 274,012 
Subsidiaries 7.8 17.0 3.1 12.7 17.6 12.3 28,656 
 
Source: BankScope 
 
Finally, our macroeconomic data were taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), the Transition reports of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the IMF World Economic Outlook and Datastream. 
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 3. ESTIMATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We estimate three types of regressions to test the priors set out in Section 1.2. In all three 
estimations the dependent variable is the credit growth of subsidiary i and the independent 
variables include a standard set of host-country conditions and a standard set of financial 
characteristics of subsidiary i itself. To test for the presence of substitution and support 
effects, we add a number of additional determinants in each of the three regressions. 
 
The first regression – (1) – is the basic model where we treat the subsidiary as if it is 
operating on a stand-alone basis. Credit growth is then solely determined by subsidiary 
specific variables and host country macroeconomic variables (priors 2 and 4). In the 
second regression – (2) – we add as additional explanatory variables a number of parent 
bank characteristics (prior 3). To the extent that support effects are important, we expect to 
find an influence of the financial characteristics of the parent bank.15 In the third regression 
– (3) – we do not measure the influence of the financial condition of the parent bank, but 
explicitly test for substitution effects. We include variables related to the (weighted) 
average risk/return characteristics of the other subsidiaries of the same bank holding (prior 
3). In doing so, we explicitly estimate the trade-off that parent banks face when deciding 
which parts of their international credit portfolio to expand or to reduce. For the same 
reason, we also include the average (weighted) GDP growth in the home country and other 
countries where the multinational bank operates (prior 1): 
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where 
• ΔLit (ΔLit-1) is the percentage credit growth of subsidiary i in year t (t-1 if lagged) 
• α1, α2 and α3 are intercept terms; γ1, γ2 and γ3 are coefficients and βk are coefficient 
vectors 
• HOSTit is a matrix of host country macroeconomic variables 
• SUBit is a matrix of characteristics related to bank subsidiary i 
• PARENTit is a matrix of characteristics related to the parent bank holding of subsidiary i  
• HOMEit is a matrix of home country macroeconomic variables 
 
15 As we use consolidated information on parent banks, endogeneity problems may occur in case of large 
subsidiaries. However, as a percentage of total parent bank assets, individual subsidiaries are relatively small, 
especially in our sample of the world’s largest banks, which in many cases also have significant non-financial 
operations and equity participations. Reverse causality is therefore unlikely. 
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 • OTHCOit is a matrix of (weighted) macroeconomic variables related to the other 
countries where the bank holding operates (excluding the home country) 
• OTHSUit is a matrix of (weighted) characteristics related to other subsidiaries of the 
parent bank 
• itε  is the idiosyncratic error, ( )2it 0, IID~ εσε  
• i=1,..., N where N is the number of bank subsidiaries in the sample 
• t=1,..., Ti where Ti is the number of years in the sample for bank subsidiary i. 
 
HOST (HOME) includes host country (home country) macroeconomic variables that are 
likely to influence the (relative) attractiveness of expanding credit in a particular host 
country (home country). These are GDP growth (+), the unemployment rate (-), the 
average bank lending rate (+), the nominal exchange rate against the US dollar (+) and 
inflation (-) (expected sign for the host country variables in parentheses). Banks are likely 
to expand lending if GDP growth increases, unemployment is low, lending rates are higher 
and inflation is lower.16 We also include crisis dummies, HOSTCRIS (HOMECRIS), which take 
on the value of “1” in case the host (home) country experienced a banking crisis in a 
particular year.17 We expect bank credit to decline during banking crises, unless the 
subsidiary is financially supported by its parent bank (see the literature cited in Footnote 
6). 
 
Similarly, OTHCO includes variables measuring the (weighted) macroeconomic 
development in the other countries of operation of the parent bank. These variables 
therefore reflect the (relative) attractiveness of expanding credit in other countries and 
proxy for the opportunity costs of expanding credit in a particular host country. For each 
year, we weigh the values for each country where a significant subsidiary is present with 
the size of the particular subsidiary relative to the sum of all subsidiaries of the same parent 
in our sample. For instance, in the earlier example of HSBC Poland (see Footnote 1), we 
construct an OTHCO GDP growth variable which measures the weighted average growth 
rate of all countries where HSBC operates except Poland and the United Kingdom. For 
example, if the HSBC subsidiary in Canada would be twice as large as the one in Ireland, 
Canadian GDP growth would count twice as much as Irish GDP growth.18 Finally, the 
OTHCRIS dummy is ‘0’ in all years except for those years in which there was a banking 
crisis in one or more other countries of the same banking group.19 
 
16 See Footnotes 7 and 8 for earlier empirical studies that include these macroeconomic determinants. To the 
extent that host country inflation leads to an increase in the nominal value of loan portfolios there would be a 
positive effect of inflation on (nominal) credit growth. However, as we redenominated our data to US dollars, 
inflationary effects should disappear to the extent that PPP holds. We also include the nominal exchange rate 
to ensure that our results for the other macroeconomic explanatory variables are not driven by residual 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
17 Information for constructing this crisis dummy is taken from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Carstens et 
al (2004). For 2004, we constructed the dummy ourselves on the basis of several publications in print and on 
the internet. 
18 In case of more than one subsidiary in a host country, we calculate the OTHCO macroeconomic variables on 
the basis of the other host countries only. For instance, when constructing the OTHCO GDP-growth variable 
for one of several Polish subsidiaries of the same parent bank, we do not include Polish GDP growth in the 
weighted OTHCO GDP-variable. This would, by construction, lead to multicollinearity between this variable 
and the Polish GDP-growth variable (included as a separate determinant). 
19 This dummy is constructed by averaging for each year the ‘0’ and ‘1’scores for the other countries were the 
parent bank has subsidiaries (weighted with the size of the respective subsidiaries). The OTHCRIS dummy is 
then assigned value ‘1’ if the weighted value equals or exceeds 0.25 and a value of ‘0’ otherwise. 
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 As for bank-specific risk and return variables, SUB consists of a number of characteristics 
of each subsidiary. First, we include solvency (total equity to total assets) and liquidity 
(total liquid assets to total assets) as measures of the bank’s risk aversion and of the 
capital/liquidity constraints of the bank. On the one hand, high capital and liquidity ratios 
may reflect that a bank is relatively risk-averse and expands credit only slowly. At the 
same time, bank subsidiaries with low capitalisation may be especially prone to moral 
hazard and rapidly expand (risky) lending (see Black and Strahan, 2002). Both effects 
imply a negative relationship between bank capital and loan growth. On the other hand, 
high capital and liquidity ratios may simply signal that liability constraints are less 
important, so that banks have ample room to expand their lending. The sign of these 
variables is thus indeterminate. Secondly, we include loan loss provisions to net interest 
revenue as a proxy for the general financial condition of the bank as well as its willingness 
to take on risk.20 An increase reflects that higher credit risk is only partially compensated 
for by higher interest margins and we therefore expect a negative effect on loan growth. 
Thirdly, we include the return on equity (+) and the net interest margin (-) as bank 
performance indicators. 
 
Finally, PARENT includes the same bank-specific variables for the parent bank of the 
particular subsidiary, whereas OTHSUB consists of (weighted) variables for the other 
subsidiaries of the bank holding (including those in the home country).21 
 
To take into account that not all (types of) subsidiaries need to be equally sensitive to 
parent bank policies, we make an a priori distinction between relatively dependent and 
relatively independent subsidiaries by constructing an ownership dummy that is “1” for all 
greenfields and “0” for all take-overs. We expect that, on average, greenfields are more 
strongly integrated into the multinational bank holding than acquired banks, at least for a 
number of years. In a separate set of estimations of equations (1) to (3), we use this dummy 
to construct interaction terms with the variables that measure the characteristics of the 
parent bank and the other subsidiaries in the same bank holding. In this way we can 
explicitly test whether any substitution and support effects are stronger for greenfields than 
for acquired banks. 
 
For all regressions we use two estimation methodologies: fixed effects and a dynamic 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) panel-data estimator (Hansen, 1982; Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). The choice for fixed effects estimations is based on Hausman tests, 
which consistently point out that fixed effects are to be preferred to random effects, as the 
determinants of credit growth are correlated with the bank-specific effects. However, in a 
dynamic context the lagged dependent variable may depend on the panel-level effects, 
potentially leading to an inconsistent estimator when the time dimension is limited 
(Nickell, 1981). To solve this potential inconsistency problem, we also estimate all 
empirical models using a GMM framework. Two additional advantages of GMM are that it 
does not require distributional assumptions, such as normality, and that it allows for 
heteroscedasticity of unknown form. We use one-step estimators of the robust variety in 
order to correct for heteroscedasticity (based on the Sargent test statistics). Throughout all 
 
20 Peek and Rosengren (2000b) find that non-performing loans of parent banks may have an even more 
significant impact on host-country lending than parent banks’ capitalisation. 
21 In this case, contrary to the macroeconomic OTHCO variables, we also include information on other 
subsidiaries in the same host country and on any separate subsidiaries in the home country (see Footnote 18). 
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 tables we report the outcomes of the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation of order 
1 and 2. These consistently show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-
order autocorrelation.22 
 
An assumption underlying our panel analysis is that the series are stationary. We tested this 
for all the right-hand side variables using a number of tests (see Annex 2). As our time 
dimension is limited, so is the discriminating power of the tests. Furthermore, many of the 
tests require the panel to be balanced. Forcing this requirement implies dropping many of 
the subsidiaries. The overall conclusion is that the variables are neither all stationary 
(Hadri (2000) test) nor are all series non-stationary (Pesaran (2003) test). The Taylor and 
Sarno (1998) test indicates that the series are I(0). 
 
 
22 Since the estimator is in first differences, first-order autocorrelation does not point to inconsistent 
estimates. 
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 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Basic empirical results 
We first estimate the basic model in which multinational bank subsidiaries’ credit growth 
only depends on lagged credit growth, characteristics of the subsidiary itself and host 
country characteristics (Table 2, columns 1 and 2). Experimenting with various 
macroeconomic variables led us to include only GDP growth, the unemployment rate and 
the crisis dummies, as these turn out to be relatively robust macroeconomic determinants 
of credit growth.23 We also include the nominal exchange rate.24 
 
Table 2 shows that profitable bank subsidiaries expand their credit faster and that 
subsidiaries that are either relatively solvent or relatively liquid show lower rates of credit 
growth. A subsidiary that becomes one percentage point more profitable on average 
expands its lending by 0.22 percentage points faster per year. However, a subsidiary that 
becomes more liquid by one percentage point sees a reduction in credit growth of about 
0.45 percentage points. Our conjecture is that relatively solvent and liquid banks are more 
risk averse and grow more slowly because they invest mainly in liquid assets.25 At the 
same time, undercapitalised subsidiaries with insured liabilities (or an expectation that they 
will be bailed out by their parent bank) may expand their (risky) lending relatively quickly 
(Vihriälä, 1996; Black and Strahan, 2002). 
 
Subsidiary banks also grow faster when economic growth is higher and unemployment is 
lower in the host country (confirming prior 4). For instance, an increase in GDP growth of 
one percentage point leads, all else equal, to an increase in a subsidiary’s credit growth of 
almost two percentage points. We also find that subsidiaries of multinational banks do not 
reduce their credit supply when the host country is hit by a systemic banking crisis. This 
last finding may point to parent banks giving financial support to their subsidiaries when 
the latter are confronted with adverse financial conditions. Section 5.1 provides similar 
estimation results for a benchmark group of domestic banks, which show that lending by 
domestic banks – which lack the support of a parent bank – is affected negatively by local 
banking crises. Therefore we find a clear difference between multinational bank 
subsidiaries and unaffiliated domestic banks (confirming prior 2). 
 
23 Contrary to what one might expect, economic growth and the unemployment rate are not very strongly 
correlated over time and across countries in our sample. 
24 See Footnote 16. Excluding the nominal exchange rate does not result in significant changes to the 
economic or statistical significance of any of the results. 
25 Reverse causality could have been an issue here: banks that grow faster will become less liquid and less 
solvent if they cannot replenish their liquid assets and capital fast enough. However, note that GMM is an 
instrumental variables technique (where the instruments are lagged values of the variables themselves) and as 
such controls for reverse causality. 
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 Table 2: Determinants of multinational bank lending: basic estimations 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged credit growth 0.06* 0.12** 0.03 0.09* 0.06 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.45) (0.10) (0.15) (0.25) 
Weakness subsidiary 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
 (1.00) (0.84) (0.86) (0.72) (0.72) (0.68) 
Profitability subsidiary 0.26*** 0.16* 0.27*** 0.17** 0.15 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.05) (0.26) (0.93) 
Liquidity subsidiary -0.50*** -0.48*** -0.43*** -0.52*** -0.35** -0.39** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) 
Solvency subsidiary -1.14*** -0.97** -1.13*** -0.90** -1.12*** -0.78* 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) 
GDP growth host 1.69*** 1.64*** 1.86*** 1.84*** 2.06*** 2.16*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemployment host -0.98** -0.45 -1.39** -1.06 -1.92*** -1.20** 
 (0.02) (0.37) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.05) 
Exchange rate (US$) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.40) (0.59) (0.32) (0.88) (0.51) (0.99) 
Crisis dummy host -2.16 -0.20 -0.17 0.62 -1.04 4.25 
 (0.59) (0.97) (0.97) (0.90) (0.86) (0.55) 
Weakness parent bank   -0.05 -0.11   
   (0.47) (0.15)   
Profitab. parent bank   -0.22 -0.21   
   (0.17) (0.28)   
Liquidity parent bank   -0.52*** -0.45**   
   (0.00) (0.05)   
Interest margin parent   5.85*** 8.31***   
   (0.00) (0.00)   
GDP growth home     -2.32*** -2.37*** 
     (0.00) (0.01) 
Weakness other subs     -0.06 -0.13 
     (0.45) (0.13) 
Profitability other subs     0.17* 0.22*** 
     (0.10) (0.01) 
Liquidity other subs     -0.13 -0.20 
     (0.34) (0.15) 
Solvency other subs     -0.03 -0.62 
     (0.95) (0.17) 
Crisis other countries     -13.71 -17.98 
     (0.21) (0.18) 
Constant 29.40*** 0.54 28.83*** 0.45 42.55*** 0.63 
 (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.13) 
Observations 967 763 905 703 677 524 
Number of banks 194 183 194 182 147 139 
R2within 0.12 - 0.14 - 0.15 - 
Hausman& 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 
AB test AR1¶ - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
AB test AR2¦ - 0.63 - 0.41 - 0.93 
Wald statistic~ - - 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Source: BankScope, Datastream, EBRD, IMF.  
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 Note: p values in parentheses   
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent  
§ Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel-data estimator (one-step, robust) 
& p value of Hausman specification test 
¶ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 
¦ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
~ p value of Wald test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are 
jointly 0 
 
Columns 3 and 4 show similar estimations, but now we also add characteristics of the 
parent bank. Our earlier results do not change: subsidiaries of multinational banks grow 
faster when host country economic growth is high and when they are relatively profitable. 
Subsidiaries that show high levels of solvency and/or liquidity generally expand their 
credit less swiftly. Interestingly, this expanded empirical model also shows that the 
balance-sheet structure of the parent bank matters for subsidiary growth. In particular, 
subsidiaries of parent banks that enjoy high net interest margins tend to grow faster.26 On 
the contrary, subsidiaries of parent banks that are highly liquid tend to grow slower, which 
is in line with our result for the liquidity of the subsidiaries themselves. These last two 
findings are in line with support effects (prior 3). 
 
Finally, we estimate a set of regressions in which we include (weighted) variables related 
to the other subsidiaries of the same multinational bank holding (columns 5 and 6).27 
Again, we replicate our finding that subsidiaries’ credit growth is positively related to the 
host country business cycle and negatively to their own liquidity and solvency. However, 
profitability is no longer a significant determinant of credit growth.28 Instead, we find that 
when other subsidiaries in the same group are relatively profitable, this positively 
influences the credit supply of a subsidiary (prior 3). Note that in case substitution effects 
would dominate, one would expect a negative relationship between other subsidiaries’ 
profitability and credit growth. Apparently, support effects are more important here: with 
(other) profitable subsidiaries, parent banks are able to give more capital support to a 
particular subsidiary. This support effect also seems to dominate the influence of 
subsidiaries’ own profitability. We also find that GDP growth in the home country exerts a 
negative influence on subsidiaries’ credit growth: a one percentage point higher economic 
growth in the home country leads to a reduction in a foreign subsidiary’s lending growth of 
about 2.3 percentage points. Parent banks weigh expanding credit growth in the home 
country against credit growth in the host country (substitution effect, confirming prior 1). 
 
 
26 Because of the high (0.8) correlation between parent banks’ interest margin and their solvency we only 
include parent banks’ interest margin. 
27 Because of the high (0.6) correlation between other subsidiaries’ interest margin and other subsidiaries’ 
solvency we only include other subsidiaries’ solvency. We include home country GDP growth but not the 
weighted GDP growth in the other countries of operation as both economic growth rates tend to be highly 
correlated. 
28 The number of banks in these two sets of estimations is smaller because we remove all subsidiary banks 
that operate in the same country as their parent bank. For these subsidiaries, the home country and the host 
country coincide so that we have to exclude them from our sample in order to prevent any artificial 
multicollinearity between the home country variables and the host country variables. 
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 Greenfield versus take-over multinational bank subsidiaries 
We expect that subsidiaries that are the result of a take-over are relatively independent as 
they may not (yet) be fully integrated into the bank holding. In contrast, greenfield 
subsidiaries – which have been built up from scratch by the parent bank – are expected to 
be more closely integrated into the bank holding and its internal capital market (see prior 
5). To test whether this is borne out by the data, we re-estimate the empirical models, this 
time interacting the main determinants with an ownership dummy which is 1 for 
greenfields and 0 for take-overs. We do not include separate ownership dummies since we 
are only interested in the effect of ownership on the strength of the earlier identified 
substitution and support effects and not so much in the separate effect of subsidiary type on 
credit growth.29 Since we want to keep the empirical models as parsimonious as possible 
we eliminate the most insignificant interaction terms, starting with the least significant 
ones. This is necessary since including too many interaction effects would lead to an 
overly large instrument matrix in the GMM estimations. Table 3 reports the results (see 
page 17). 
 
As before, we find that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is sensitive to their own 
profitability (+), liquidity (-) and solvency (-), as well as to GDP growth in the home 
country (-). In case other subsidiaries in the same group are relatively profitable, this 
stimulates the credit supply of a subsidiary and dominates the effect of the subsidiary’s 
own profitability. We also confirm that subsidiaries of parent banks with high interest 
margins grow faster, whereas subsidiaries of highly liquid bank holdings grow slower. 
 
On the basis of the interaction terms, we find weak evidence (10 per cent confidence level) 
that while lending by take-over subsidiaries is sensitive to the weakness of their balance 
sheet, this does not seem to hold for greenfield subsidiaries. This is in line with a stronger 
role of the parent bank in the case of greenfields compared to take-overs. Also, we find 
strong evidence that host country GDP growth only matters for greenfield subsidiaries. The 
credit supply of take-overs is much less procyclical, perhaps because these banks have not 
yet been well integrated into the parent bank and substitution effects are therefore less 
important. 
 
 
29 Moreover, bank ownership is a time-invariant, bank-specific variable and its influence is already captured 
by our fixed effects in the FE estimations. 
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 Table 3: Determinants of multinational bank lending: ownership interaction 
     terms 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged credit growth 0.05 0.09* 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.19) (0.07) (0.50) (0.19) (0.15) (0.26) 
Weakness subsidiary -0.12* -0.13* -0.12* -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
Weakness/greenfield 
interaction 
0.13* 0.13* 0.12* 0.12 0.14 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) 
Profitability subsidiary 0.24*** 0.18* 0.25*** 0.20** 0.16 0.05 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.05) (0.24) (0.74) 
Liquidity subsidiary -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.42*** -0.48*** -0.35** -0.40** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Solvency subsidiary -1.10*** -1.07*** -1.07*** -1.09*** -1.08** -0.85** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
GDP growth host -0.51 -0.39 -0.55 -0.63 0.06 0.34 
 (0.50) (0.62) (0.48) (0.51) (0.95) (0.62) 
GDP growth/greenfield 
interaction 
2.59*** 2.46*** 2.94*** 2.93*** 2.42*** 2.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Exchange rate (US$) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.27) (0.39) (0.19) (0.56) (0.38) (0.96) 
Crisis dummy host -4.61 0.08 -2.28 1.11 -1.54 4.34 
 (0.24) (0.99) (0.62) (0.83) (0.79) (0.55) 
Unemployment host -0.87** -0.31 -1.24** -0.95 -1.83*** -1.05* 
 (0.04) (0.55) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00) (0.10) 
Weakness parent bank   -0.05 -0.12   
   (0.52) (0.15)   
Profitability parent bank   -0.23 -0.21   
   (0.14) (0.27)   
Liquidity parent bank   -0.54*** -0.42**   
   (0.00) (0.04)   
Interest margin parent   5.98*** 7.37***   
   (0.00) (0.00)   
GDP growth home     -2.24*** -2.39*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
Weakness other subs     -0.06 -0.12 
     (0.42) (0.13) 
Profitability other subs     0.18* 0.27*** 
     (0.05) (0.00) 
Liquidity other subs     -0.12 -0.21 
     (0.41) (0.14) 
Solvency other subs     -0.09 -0.69 
     (0.86) (0.15) 
Crisis other countries     -14.16 -15.86 
     (0.20) (0.25) 
Constant 30.73*** 0.55 29.91*** 0.48 42.42*** 0.71* 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.10) 
Observations 971 765 908 704 677 524 
Number of banks 195 184 195 183 147 139 
R2within 0.13 - 0.16 - 0.16 - 
Hausman& 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 
AB test AR1¶ - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
AB test AR2¦ - 0.69 - 0.42 - 0.96 
Wald statistic~ - - 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Source: BankScope, Datastream, EBRD, IMF.  
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 Note: p values in parentheses   
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent  
§ Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel-data estimator (one-step, robust) 
& p value of Hausman specification test 
¶ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 
¦ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
~ p value of Wald test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are 
jointly 0 
“Ownership” is a dummy which takes on the values of 0 (1) for take-overs (greenfields) 
 
 
The influence of geographical distance 
The influence of parent bank characteristics and economic developments in the home 
country on subsidiaries’ credit growth may change if the distance between the parent bank 
and a subsidiary increases. In case of a larger distance, parent banks can operate an internal 
capital market on a more objective basis since there is less room for local bank managers to 
influence the headquarters with “softer” arguments (Carlin et al, 2006). The incentives of 
subsidiary bank managers need not be fully aligned with those of the bank as a whole, 
leading to internal agency costs. Banks with distant subsidiaries may be less liable to such 
internal agency costs if they use more formally structured decision-making mechanisms 
that reduce the opportunities for foreign subsidiary managers to evade the financial 
discipline of the internal capital market.30 Parent banks are then more likely to reduce the 
capital that is allocated to subsidiaries in slowly growing economies (“loser sticking”) and 
to increase capital to subsidiaries in high growth countries (“winner picking”). However, 
this effect may be partly or completely counterbalanced if greater distances between 
parents and subsidiaries would mean that more internal information is lost and the 
operation of an internal capital market therefore becomes more difficult.31 
 
To analyse the importance of geographical distance, we interact all macroeconomic 
variables and parent bank characteristics with a measure of the geographical distance 
between the parent bank and the subsidiary.32 This variable is calculated on the basis of the 
latitude and longitude co-ordinates of both banks using the great circle distance formula, 
which measures the shortest distance between any two points along a path on the surface of 
the earth. Regression estimations showed that especially the interaction term between host 
country GDP growth and geographical distance is significantly positive and robust. The 
procyclicality of subsidiary lending therefore turns out to be mainly due to foreign 
subsidiaries that are relatively far away from the parent banks. Table 3 already shows that 
the strong procyclical lending behaviour of multinational bank subsidiaries was driven by 
greenfield subsidiaries. This leads to the question of whether greenfield subsidiaries are, on 
average, further away from their parent banks than subsidiaries that are the result of a take-
over. This turns out to be the case: foreign greenfields are on average 773 km further away 
from their parents than foreign take-overs (but this difference is not significant). 
 
 
30 See Degryse et al (2007) for an overview of the literature on how distance and organisational structure 
influence bank lending. 
31 See Carlin et al (2006) for a similar application to non-financial multinationals. 
32 As in Table 3 and in line with Carlin et al (2006) we do not include distance as a separate determinant as 
we are only interested in the effect of distance on the influence of the parent bank and not so much in any 
separate effect distance may have on the credit growth of a multinational bank subsidiary. 
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 So are greenfields really different from take-over subsidiaries as regards their integration 
into the multinational bank or are they just different because they tend to be further away? 
Table 4 shows regressions similar to those in Table 3, but now also including the 
interaction term between host-country GDP growth and geographical distance. It transpires 
that the procyclicality of local lending is driven by both the greenfield effect and the 
distance effect. Greenfields are not just different because they are on average further away 
from the parent bank. They are also more strongly integrated into the parent bank. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of multinational bank lending: ownership interaction 
     terms and distance interaction terms 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged credit growth 0.06* 0.12** 0.04 0.08 0.07* 0.08 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.33) (0.13) (0.10) (0.20) 
Weakness subsidiary -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.89) (0.92) (0.99) (0.95) (0.65) (0.64) 
Profitability subsidiary 0.27*** 0.18** 0.28*** 0.21** 0.18 0.06 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.18) (0.70) 
Liquidity subsidiary -0.50*** -0.48*** -0.42*** -0.49*** -0.35** -0.34* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) 
Solvency subsidiary -1.06*** -0.89** -1.00*** -0.70* -1.03*** -0.70* 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08) 
GDP growth host -0.93 -1.26 -1.19 -1.87* -0.35 0.04 
 (0.26) (0.18) (0.18) (0.09) (0.75) (0.98) 
GDP growth/greenfield 
interaction 
1.95*** 1.92** 2.32*** 2.55*** 1.82** 1.77** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) 
GDP/distance 
interaction 
0.16** 0.20** 0.17** 0.21** 0.12 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.27) (0.55) 
Exchange rate (US$) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.35) (0.41) (0.29) (0.67) (0.55) (0.87) 
Crisis dummy host -2.07 -0.39 0.63 1.03 2.53 3.46 
 (0.60) (0.94) (0.90) (0.84) (0.68) (0.64) 
Unemployment host -1.03*** -0.49 -1.31** -0.92 -1.98*** -1.09* 
 (0.01) (0.32) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00) (0.07) 
Weakness parent bank   -0.06 -0.13*   
   (0.38) (0.09)   
Profitability parent 
bank 
  -0.13 -0.09   
   (0.40) (0.64)   
Liquidity parent bank   -0.55*** -0.52**   
   (0.00) (0.02)   
Interest margin parent   5.39*** 7.06***   
   (0.01) (0.00)   
GDP growth home     -1.79** -1.94* 
     (0.04) (0.10) 
Weakness other subs     -0.07 -0.13 
     (0.33) (0.14) 
Profitability other subs     0.17* 0.23*** 
     (0.10) (0.00) 
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 Liquidity other subs     -0.14 -0.19 
     (0.34) (0.19) 
Solvency other subs     -0.05 -0.58 
     (0.92) (0.20) 
Crisis other countries     -11.42 -15.83 
     (0.30) (0.24) 
Constant 31.20*** 0.56* 30.47*** 0.41 42.78*** 0.70* 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.09) 
Observations 967 763 905 703 674 523 
Number of banks 194 183 194 182 146 138 
R2within 0.13 - 0.16 - 0.16 - 
Hausman& 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 
AB test AR1¶ - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
AB test AR2¦ - 0.62 - 0.39 - 0.94 
Wald statistic~ - - 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 
 
Source: BankScope, Datastream, EBRD, IMF.  
Note: p values in parentheses     
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent  
§ Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel-data estimator (one-step, robust) 
& p value of Hausman specification test 
¶ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 
¦ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
~ p value of Wald test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are 
jointly 0 
“Ownership” is a dummy which takes on the values of 0 (1) for take-overs (greenfields) 
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 5. ROBUSTNESS 
 
The empirical results presented in Section 4 are in line with support effects and substitution 
effects: the credit growth of subsidiaries is partly determined by developments in other 
parts of the multinational banking group. However, the results we find may to some extent 
also reflect other mechanisms that do not reflect intra-bank relationships. For instance, 
macroeconomic developments in the home country may affect the lending of a 
multinational bank subsidiary in a host country because of more general linkages between 
the home country and the host country. Such linkages may also influence the credit supply 
of domestic banks. 
 
As an example, if economic growth in Spain picks up, this may lead Spanish (non-
financial) firms that operate in both Spain and Latin America to expand their Spanish 
activities at the expense of their Latin American operations. To the extent that this shift in 
focus reduces their demand for bank financing in Latin America, lending by Spanish bank 
subsidiaries and domestic Latin American banks will decrease. We would then observe a 
negative correlation between Spanish GDP growth and lending by all types of banks in 
Latin America. Note that such a negative relationship cannot be attributed to an active 
involvement of the Spanish parent banks in the credit supply of their foreign subsidiaries. 
Rather, it would reflect a passive reaction of multinational bank subsidiaries and/or of 
domestic banks to changes in credit demand that follow from general macroeconomic 
linkages. To analyse the extent to which our results are driven by such general 
macroeconomic linkages between countries, in addition to specific intra-bank financial 
relationships, we perform two robustness tests. 
 
Domestic banks as a benchmark 
As a first robustness test we estimate the same regressions as in Table 2, but now for a 
benchmark group consisting of the five largest domestically-owned banks in each host 
country (Table 5). The domestic banks in this benchmark group are on average very 
similar to the multinational bank subsidiaries (see Annex 2). The main difference is that 
domestic banks have substantially higher loan loss provisions to net interest revenue ratios, 
indicating a weaker loan portfolio. 
 
In the first two columns of Table 5 the basic model, in which credit growth only depends 
on the bank’s own characteristics and on local economic developments, is re-estimated. 
The results indicate that domestic bank lending depends on profitability, liquidity, 
solvency and the local business cycle in much the same way as lending by multinational 
bank subsidiaries does. However, lending by domestic banks tends to be somewhat less 
procyclical (lower sensitivity to host country growth) than lending by multinational bank 
subsidiaries (in line with prior 4). 
 
Another interesting difference is that domestic bank lending decreases substantially and 
significantly during banking crises: when a country is hit by a banking crisis, domestic 
banks on average reduce their bank lending growth by more than seven percentage points. 
This stands in sharp contrast to the results in Table 2 where none of the estimations 
provides any evidence that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is sensitive to 
episodes of banking stress. Apparently, multinational bank subsidiaries can rely on 
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 parental capital and liquidity back-up in case of a financial crisis in the host country, a 
form of support that is obviously not available to domestic banks. This finding confirms 
our second prior and is in line with results reported by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) 
for a sample of transition countries. 
 
We also want to check whether lending by domestic banks is influenced by developments 
in the home countries of their foreign competitors. If we find such influences, this would 
imply that our earlier results for multinational bank subsidiaries do not only reflect intra-
bank linkages but also broader economic relationships between home countries and host 
countries. To analyse this issue, we link each domestic bank to a “foster parent bank”. We 
create for each host country a set of foster parent banks that includes all the parent banks of 
the multinational bank subsidiaries that operate in that host country. When this number of 
foster parent banks was less than five, we added additional banks from the same home 
countries. We then randomly assign one of these foster parent banks to each domestic 
bank. As the results of a single random assignment are not representative, we estimate each 
model 1,000 times. 
 
Table 5 reports the mean estimated coefficients and p values of these 1,000 runs in 
columns 3 to 6. Since no real ownership linkages exist between the domestic banks and 
their foster parent banks, any results we would find that point to a sensitivity to the foster 
parent bank’s characteristics (columns 3 and 4) or to the characteristics of other 
subsidiaries of the foster parent bank (columns 5 and 6) cannot be explained by an internal 
capital market and must therefore be attributed to more general macroeconomic linkages. 
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 Table 5: Determinants of domestic bank lending 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of domestic banks (in per cent) 
 Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ Fixed 
effects 
GMM§ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged credit growth 0.06** 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.50) (0.82) (0.32) (0.12) (0.20) 
Weakness domestic bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.70) (0.81) (0.86) (0.82) (0.74) (0.86) 
Profitability domestic bank 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.54*** 0.42*** 0.27** 0.21 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.25) 
Liquidity domestic bank -0.23*** -0.29** -0.29*** -0.41** -0.32** -0.22 
 (0.00) (0.04 (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.30) 
Solvency domestic bank -0.69*** -0.79* -0.91*** -0.73 -1.03** -0.61 
 (0.00)  (0.09) (0.00) (0.19) (0.04) (0.38) 
GDP growth host country 1.24*** 1.62*** 0.85*** 1.21*** 1.78*** 1.76*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Unemployment host country -1.09*** 0.21 -0.68 0.37 -2.00*** -0.81 
 (0.00) (1.00) (0.16) (0.63) (0.00) (0.42) 
Crisis dummy host country -6.93*** -4.37* -9.62*** -7.55*** 3.75 6.08 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.46) 
Exchange rate (US$) -0.01** -0.02*** -0.02* -0.02*** -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.18) (0.22) 
Weakness foster parent   0.01 -0.06   
   (0.89) (0.51)   
Profitability foster parent   -0.06 -0.16   
   (0.72) (0.51)   
Liquidity foster parent   -0.08 0.29   
   (0.62) (0.23)   
Interest margin foster parent   3.18 11.16***   
   (0.13) (0.00)   
GDP growth foster home 
country 
    -1.24* -1.68* 
     (0.10) (0.06) 
Weakness other subs foster     -0.05 -0.07 
     (0.50) (0.30) 
Profitability other subs foster     0.06 0.15 
     (0.78) (0.49) 
Liquidity other subs foster     -0.14 -0.28 
     (0.38) (0.15) 
Solvency other subs foster     -0.12 -0.24 
     (0.82) (0.67) 
Crisis other countries foster     -9.21 -11.17 
     (0.20) (0.28) 
Constant 22.73*** 0.22 19.42*** 1.45*** 40.82*** 0.29** 
 (0.00) (0.37) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
Observations 1413 1241 957 719 653 487 
Number of banks 185 175 184 172 148 138 
R2within 0.13 - 0.13 - 0.14 - 
Hausman& 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 
AB test AR1¶ - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 
AB test AR2¦ - 1.76 - 1.69 - 0.31 
Wald statistic~ - - 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 
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 Source: BankScope, Datastream, EBRD, IMF.  
Note: p values in parentheses     
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent  
§ Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel-data estimator (one-step, robust) 
& p value of Hausman specification test 
¶ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 
¦ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
~ p value of Wald test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are 
jointly 0 
 
 
The results show that domestic banks are generally not sensitive to the liquidity and net 
interest margin of their foster parent banks.33 We also find that while lending by 
multinational bank subsidiaries is sensitive to profitability changes in other subsidiaries of 
their parent bank, domestic banks are not sensitive at all to the profitability in the 
subsidiaries of the foster parent bank. These results imply that our earlier results for 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries, which was consistently sensitive to (1) the 
liquidity and (2) interest margin of their (real) parent banks as well as to (3) the 
profitability of other subsidiaries in the same group, indeed point to internal capital market 
effects. Note, however, that we also find weak evidence (10 per cent level) that lending by 
domestic banks is negatively related to the business cycle in the home countries of their 
foreign competitor banks. Yet, the statistical significance of this result is much lower than 
in the regression results for the multinational bank subsidiaries. Apparently, in addition to 
the effects of internal capital markets, macroeconomic linkages between home countries 
and host countries also influence the lending of host country banks. 
 
 
Linking multinational bank subsidiaries to foster parent banks 
As a second robustness test, we randomly link each multinational bank subsidiary to an 
alternative foster parent bank from the same home country. For each host country, the set 
of foster parent banks again consists of approximately five large banks.34 Annex 2 shows 
that the average foster parent bank is quite similar to the average real parent bank, although 
foster parent banks are on average smaller. Again, as the results of a single random 
allocation of foster parent banks to multinational bank subsidiaries are not representative, 
we estimate each model 1,000 times. Table 6 reports the mean estimated coefficients and p 
values of these 1,000 runs. As before, we expect our earlier results to become insignificant 
as credit growth of a multinational bank subsidiary should not depend on what is going on 
in other institutions in the home country of its true parent bank. 
 
When we compare the results in Table 6 with our earlier results in Table 2, we find that 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries is negatively related to the business cycle in the 
home country of the foster parent bank. This is logical as, by construction, the foster parent 
bank is located in the same country as the real parent bank and we already knew – see 
 
33 Except for a significant interest margin coefficient in column 4. 
34 We include additional home country banks in our set of foster parent banks in case there were not enough 
real parent banks from the same home country available. For instance, since we have only one Danish parent 
bank (Danske Bank) in our original dataset, we added four additional large Danish banks to our set of 
potential Danish foster parent banks. 
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 Table 2 – that there exists a strong negative link between the home country business cycle 
of the parent bank and the lending of the multinational bank subsidiary. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of multinational bank lending: linking multinational      
     bank subsidiaries to “foster parents” 
 
Dependent variable: credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries (in per cent) 
 Fixed effects GMM§ Fixed effects GMM§ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged credit growth 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 
 (0.97) (0.58) (0.65) (0.89) 
Weakness subsidiary 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.93) (0.89) (0.38) (0.54) 
Profitability subsidiary 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.14 0.12 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.52) 
Liquidity subsidiary -0.42*** -0.35* -0.33** -0.30 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.15) 
Solvency subsidiary -1.27*** -0.93 -1.51** -0.92 
 (0.01) (0.24) (0.02) (0.31) 
GDP growth host country 0.93** 0.85 1.13** 1.23** 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) 
Unemployment host country -0.75 -0.45 -0.99 -0.76 
 (0.28) (0.62) (0.22) (0.42) 
Exchange rate (US$) -0.03** -0.03* -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) 
Crisis dummy host country -8.80 -7.78* -11.26* -7.23 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
Weakness foster parent bank -0.07 -0.08   
 (0.28) (0.13)   
Profitability foster parent bank -0.13 -0.13   
 (0.46) (0.49)   
Liquidity foster parent bank -0.36 -0.22   
 (0.12) (0.45)   
Interest margin foster parent bank 4.02 4.55   
 (0.15) (0.21)   
GDP growth home country foster   -1.93** -2.05** 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
Weakness other subs foster   -0.07 -0.08 
   (0.39) (0.36) 
Profitability other subs foster   0.34 0.40* 
   (0.11) (0.06) 
Liquidity other subs foster   0.02 0.02 
   (0.89) (0.90) 
Solvency other subs foster   -0.73 -0.84 
   (0.24) (0.22) 
Crisis other countries foster   -5.79 -5.40 
   (0.70) (0.74) 
Constant 33.21*** 0.77 45.02*** 1.10** 
 (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.06) 
Observations 634 481 455 339 
Number of banks 149 141 111 106 
R2within 0.12 - 0.16 - 
Hausman& 0.00 - 0.00 - 
AB test AR1¶ - 0.00 - 0.00 
AB test AR2¦ - 0.71 - 0.20 
Wald statistic~ 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
 
Source: BankScope, Datastream, EBRD, IMF. 
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 Note: p values in parentheses 
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent 
§ Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel-data estimator (one-step, robust) 
& p value of Hausman specification test 
¶ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 
¦ p value of Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
~ p value of Wald test that parameters associated with parent bank/other subsidiaries variables are 
jointly 0 
 
More importantly, we find that while multinational bank subsidiaries are sensitive to the 
liquidity and interest margin of their true parent bank (see Table 2), their lending does not 
depend on the liquidity and interest margin of a foster parent bank in the same home 
country. We also find that while lending by multinational bank subsidiaries depends very 
much on profitability changes in other subsidiaries of the “true” parent bank, this effect 
completely disappears in the fixed effects regressions and is only marginally significant 
(10 per cent) in the GMM regression. As with our first robustness test, these results 
strengthen our claim that our earlier empirical findings indeed reflect intra-bank linkages in 
the form of an internal capital market. 
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 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our findings provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that multinational banks actively 
manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. Multinational bank subsidiaries are 
therefore not stand-alone operations but are influenced by developments in other 
subsidiaries in the group and in other countries of operation. Robustness tests show that 
these findings are not the result of more general macroeconomic international linkages, but 
are due to the operation of internal capital markets. This paper is the first to expand the 
analysis of lending by bank subsidiaries to the international level. As Houston et al (1997) 
did for bank holdings at the national level, our paper provides indirect evidence for the 
operation of internal capital markets at the international level. 
 
More specifically, we find that although profitable subsidiaries expand their lending faster, 
subsidiaries are not only affected by their own balance sheet but also by developments in 
other parts of the multinational banking group. In line with substitution effects, we find 
that subsidiaries expand their lending faster if economic growth in their home country 
decreases. Apparently, parent banks trade off expanding credit growth in the home country 
against the host country. Likewise, we find that higher host country growth positively 
influences credit growth, but here the substitution effect is limited to greenfield 
subsidiaries and subsidiaries that are relatively far away from the parent bank. 
 
We also find evidence for support effects. Subsidiaries of parent banks with a high net 
interest margin tend to grow faster, while subsidiaries of highly liquid parent banks tend to 
grow slower. If other subsidiaries in the same group are relatively profitable, this positively 
influences the credit supply of a subsidiary: with (other) profitable subsidiaries parent 
banks are able to give more capital support. We also find that subsidiaries of multinational 
banks, in sharp contrast to domestic banks, do not tend to reduce their credit supply when 
the host country is hit by a banking crisis. Finally, we find that whereas the credit growth 
of (strongly integrated) greenfield subsidiaries is not sensitive to their own balance-sheet 
strength, this does not hold for the (more independent) take-overs. Apparently, the latter 
group can rely less on parental support and is therefore forced to slow down their lending if 
their balance sheet gets weaker. 
 
Our findings that multinational banks both support subsidiaries and trade off lending 
opportunities across countries imply that affiliated banks are better positioned to exploit 
local lending opportunities. This provides a rationale for cross-border bank consolidation. 
At the same time, however, multinational bank entry means that a country becomes more 
exposed to foreign economic shocks. Here the total number of banks that are in foreign 
hands is important, as is the diversity regarding the home countries where the parent banks 
are headquartered. 
 
If only a limited number of local banks are part of a multinational bank holding, or if many 
banks are part of a multinational bank but these banks are headquartered in quite different 
home countries, aggregate bank lending in the host country will become less dependent on 
local economic development and thus be less procyclical. This contrasts with a situation in 
which a substantial share of the banking sector is taken over by parent holding companies 
from one single home country. (One can think, for instance, of the dominance of Swedish 
bank subsidiaries in the Baltic countries.) In that case the host country becomes strongly 
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 exposed to one particular foreign economy that may be less desirable from the perspective 
of macroeconomic stability. 
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 Annex 1: List of multinational banks in sample 
 
 Name bank holding Home country Number of 
subsidiaries
Host countries 
1 ABN Amro Holding The 
Netherlands 
5 AU, BR, FR, NL, US 
2 Allied Irish Bank Ireland 2 PL, UK 
3 Banca Intesa Italy 11 HR, FR, HU, IE, IT, 
PE, SK 
4 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain 9 AR, CL, CO, MX, PE, 
PT, ES, US, VE 
5 Banco Comercial Português Portugal 2 MZ, PL 
6 Banco Popular Español Spain 8 FR, ES 
7 Banco Santander Central Hispano Spain 11 BR, CL, DE, MX, ES, 
US, VE 
8 Bank of America United States 2 HK, US 
9 Bank of Ireland Ireland 1 UK 
10 Bank of Montreal Canada 2 IE, US 
11 Barclays Bank United Kingdom 1 ES 
12 Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank 
Germany 9 CZ, HU, PL, RU, AT 
13 BNP Paribas France 4 FR, US 
14 Caja de Ahor. y Pens. de 
Barcelona 
Spain 2 FR, ES 
15 Citicorp United States 8 BR, CA, MY, MX, PL, 
US 
16 Commerzbank Germany 4 DE, NL, PL 
17 Danske Bank Denmark 1 NO 
18 Deutsche Bank Germany 6 DE, IT, ES, US 
19 Dexia Belgium 7 BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, 
ES 
20 Dresdner Bank Germany 1 DE 
21 DZ Bank Germany 4 DE, IE 
22 Erste Bank Austria 8 CZ, HU, AT, SK 
23 FöreningsSparbanken 
(Swedbank) 
Sweden 5 EE, LV, LT, SE 
24 Fortis Bank Belgium 3 BE, FR, NL 
25 Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 3 FR, IT 
26 HBOS United Kingdom 4 IE, UK 
27 HSBC Holdings United Kingdom 12 BR, CA, FR, DE, HK, 
IN, MY, SA, UK, US 
28 ING Bank The 
Netherlands 
5 BE, CA, FR, NL, PL 
29 KBC Bank Belgium 7 BE, CZ, DE, HU, IE, 
PL 
30 MBNA Corp United States 3 CA, UK, US 
31 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group Japan 4 JP, US 
32 National Australia Bank Australia 2 NZ, UK 
33 National Bank of Greece Greece 4 BG, CA, CY, US 
34 Nordea Bank Sweden 6 DK, FI, NO, SE 
35 Rabobank Group The 
Netherlands 
1 IE 
36 Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Oesterreich 
Austria 8 BG, HR, CZ, PL, RU, 
SI, UA, SK 
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 37 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 2 UK, US 
38 Royal Bank of Scotland Group United Kingdom 5 UK, US 
39 Scotiabank Canada 4 SV, MX, UK, US 
40 SEB Sweden 5 EE, DE, LV, LT, SE 
41 Standard Chartered United Kingdom 4 KE, MY, TH, UK 
42 Société Générale France 7 AU, CA, CZ, FR, DE 
43 UBS Switzerland 1 UK 
44 UniCredit Group Italy 5 BG, IE, IT, PL 
45 WGZ Bank Germany 2 DE, IE 
 
Country abbreviations: AR=Argentina, AT=Austria, AU=Australia, BE=Belgium, BG=Bulgaria, 
BR=Brazil, CA=Canada, CL=Chile, CO=Colombia, CY=Cyprus, CZ=Czech Republic, 
DE=Germany, DK=Denmark, EE=Estonia, ES=Spain, FI=Finland, FR=France, HK=Hong Kong, 
HR=Croatia, HU=Hungary, IE=Ireland, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, KE=Kenya, LV=Latvia, 
LT=Lithuania, MX=Mexico, MY=Malaysia, MZ=Mozambique, NL=The Netherlands, NO=Norway, 
NZ=New Zealand, PE=Peru, PL=Poland, PT=Portugal, RU=Russia, SA=Saudi Arabia, 
SE=Sweden, SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovak Republic, SV=El Salvador, TH=Thailand, UA=Ukraine, 
UK=United Kingdom, US=United States of America, VE=Venezuela. 
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 Annex 2: Summary statistics regarding parent banks, subsidiaries, domestic banks 
      and foster parent banks 
 
 Solvency 
(%) 
Liquidity 
(%) 
Interest 
margin 
(%) 
Profitability 
(%) 
Weakness 
(%) 
Loan 
growth 
(%) 
Total 
assets 
(million $) 
Parent 
banks 
5.3 17.0 2.4 13.8 18.4 11.1 274,012   
Subsidiaries 7.8 17.0 3.1 12.7 17.6 12.3 28,656 
Domestic 
banks 
8.6 18.9 4.0 10.5 27.2 10.8 26,058 
Foster 
parents 
5.4 16.6 2.4 11.2 24.4 11.3 127,646 
 
Results of the various stationarity tests 
 
 Solvency 
(%) 
Liquidity 
(%) 
Interest 
margin 
(%) 
Profitability 
(%) 
Weakness 
(%) 
Hadri (2000)* I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Pesaran (2003) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
Taylor and Sarno 
(1998) 
I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 
* Based on a balanced sub-panel as required by the Hadri (2000) panel unit root test. 
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